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Merge branch 'master' into nico-sensitive-attr

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* master:
  add CI4-auth link in README. fix #107 (#123)
  remove insecure rng providers and remove polyfill for hash_equals (#122)
  delete files specific to code editors (#120)
  Exclude useless files from dist archive #103
This commit is contained in:
Nicolas CARPi
2024-04-16 18:21:01 +02:00
parent 83c7449270 ecef270ba7
commit e08b0a5445
16 changed files with 25 additions and 385 deletions
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lib/TwoFactorAuth.php
+5 -41
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@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ declare(strict_types=1);
namespace RobThree\Auth;
use function hash_equals;
use RobThree\Auth\Providers\Qr\IQRCodeProvider;
use RobThree\Auth\Providers\Qr\QRServerProvider;
use RobThree\Auth\Providers\Rng\CSRNGProvider;
use RobThree\Auth\Providers\Rng\HashRNGProvider;
use RobThree\Auth\Providers\Rng\IRNGProvider;
use RobThree\Auth\Providers\Rng\OpenSSLRNGProvider;
use RobThree\Auth\Providers\Time\HttpTimeProvider;
use RobThree\Auth\Providers\Time\ITimeProvider;
use RobThree\Auth\Providers\Time\LocalMachineTimeProvider;
@@ -52,14 +52,11 @@ class TwoFactorAuth
/**
* Create a new secret
*/
public function createSecret(int $bits = 80, bool $requirecryptosecure = true): string
public function createSecret(int $bits = 80): string
{
$secret = '';
$bytes = (int)ceil($bits / 5); // We use 5 bits of each byte (since we have a 32-character 'alphabet' / BASE32)
$rngprovider = $this->getRngProvider();
if ($requirecryptosecure && !$rngprovider->isCryptographicallySecure()) {
throw new TwoFactorAuthException('RNG provider is not cryptographically secure');
}
$rnd = $rngprovider->getRandomBytes($bytes);
for ($i = 0; $i < $bytes; $i++) {
$secret .= self::$_base32[ord($rnd[$i]) & 31]; //Mask out left 3 bits for 0-31 values
@@ -99,7 +96,7 @@ class TwoFactorAuth
for ($i = -$discrepancy; $i <= $discrepancy; $i++) {
$ts = $timestamp + ($i * $this->period);
$slice = $this->getTimeSlice($ts);
$timeslice = $this->codeEquals($this->getCode($secret, $ts), $code) ? $slice : $timeslice;
$timeslice = hash_equals($this->getCode($secret, $ts), $code) ? $slice : $timeslice;
}
return $timeslice > 0;
@@ -175,19 +172,7 @@ class TwoFactorAuth
*/
public function getRngProvider(): IRNGProvider
{
if ($this->rngprovider !== null) {
return $this->rngprovider;
}
if (function_exists('random_bytes')) {
return $this->rngprovider = new CSRNGProvider();
}
if (function_exists('openssl_random_pseudo_bytes')) {
return $this->rngprovider = new OpenSSLRNGProvider();
}
if (function_exists('hash')) {
return $this->rngprovider = new HashRNGProvider();
}
throw new TwoFactorAuthException('Unable to find a suited RNGProvider');
return $this->rngprovider ??= new CSRNGProvider();
}
public function getTimeProvider(): ITimeProvider
@@ -196,27 +181,6 @@ class TwoFactorAuth
return $this->timeprovider ??= new LocalMachineTimeProvider();
}
/**
* Timing-attack safe comparison of 2 codes (see http://blog.ircmaxell.com/2014/11/its-all-about-time.html)
*/
private function codeEquals(string $safe, string $user): bool
{
if (function_exists('hash_equals')) {
return hash_equals($safe, $user);
}
// In general, it's not possible to prevent length leaks. So it's OK to leak the length. The important part is that
// we don't leak information about the difference of the two strings.
if (strlen($safe) === strlen($user)) {
$result = 0;
$strlen = strlen($safe);
for ($i = 0; $i < $strlen; $i++) {
$result |= (ord($safe[$i]) ^ ord($user[$i]));
}
return $result === 0;
}
return false;
}
private function getTime(?int $time = null): int
{
return $time ?? $this->getTimeProvider()->getTime();